The book

So the book is released. In some way it’s very much an eye opener. From now on the general cannot claim that he is ideologically on the same side as the rest of the world is concerned in this war on terror (WOT). He became allies with the US/sane world because, in his own word, “if we do not join them, can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The answer was no”. As a matter of fact, he “war-gamed the United States as an adversary”. Then he/they figured out that it was like committing suicide. It would have been a very interesting scenario if the war games would have resulted in any other outcome. For example, if, say his country would have had .. maybe .. a 25% chance of coming around and defeating the mighty armies of the world – what would have he chosen then? Maybe then there would never have been an unwilling ally in this WOT and maybe his country would never had to answer all the hard question – like ‘why don’t you capture OBL’ or ‘why do you have thousands of terrorists camps’ or ‘why do you let militants cross over to your territory’ and ‘why do you have thousands of madrasas teaching hatred for others’ AND it would have been much easier for the rest of the world as well – they would not be hard pressed to think which side, truly, is he on?

So the next time you say that you are not on the side of the terrorists and fighting with the world as allies in this unconventional war, watch out – we know whose side are you really on and why you are sitting on the same table as us.

Here is an excerpt from the book:

My decision was based on the wellbeing of my people and the best interests of my country — Pakistan always comes first. I war-gamed the United States as an adversary. There would be a violent and angry reaction if we didn’t support the United States. Thus the question was: if we do not join them, can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The answer was no, we could not, on three counts.

First was our military weakness as compared with the strength of the United States. Second was our economic weakness. We had no oil, and we did not have the capacity to sustain our economy in the face of an attack. Third, and worst of all, was our social weakness. We lack the homogeneity to galvanise the entire nation into an active confrontation. We could not endure a military confrontation with the United States from any point of view. The ultimate question that confronted me was whether it was in our national interest to destroy ourselves for the Taleban. Were they worth committing suicide over? The answer was a resounding no.

In some ways I think he does not even know what he is writing - and for whom – for surely – there are 2 very distinct groups of people who will read this book. One at home and the other outside. Instead of doing the book tour in the US, he should have done it in his hometown – and if I were him – I would have done something, anything that would have prevented anybody else getting a hand on the book. This book is purely meant to be for local consumption – to bolster his image, to improve the image of his country in his own people’s eyes – a lot to do with self esteem – really.